

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Moshe Dayan, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 3.
2. *Official Egyptian military sources*, Cairo, Egypt, hereafter cited as *OEMS*; *New York Times*, 31 October 1956:4; and Kennett Love, *Suez: The Twice Fought War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 495–96. Information on the location of the 2d and 3d Divisions before the nationalization act comes from the *New York Times*, whereas that on the two armored brigades appears in Love.
3. Muhammad Haykal, *Qissa al-Suways* [The story of Suez] (1977; reprint, Beirut: Shirka al-Matbu'at lil-Tauzi' wa al-Nashr, 1985), 123–24, 126, 129–30; and Muhammad Haykal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez Through Egyptian Eyes* (New York: Arbor House, 1987), 120, 122.
4. On this important meeting, see Haykal, *Qissa al-Suways*, 150.
5. *New York Times*, 2 November 1956:3; Love, *Suez*, 492; Erskine B. Childers, *The Road to Suez* (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1962), 231–32; Trevor N. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947–1974* (1978; reprint, Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, 1984), 146; and Edgar O'Ballance, *The Sinai Campaign of 1956* (New York: Praeger, 1959), 50.
6. *OEMS*; Muhammad Kamal Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka Sina wa Qanat al-Suways* [The battle of the Sinai and the Suez Canal] (Cairo: al-Wa'y al-Arabi, 1960), 103; Moshe Dayan, *Diary*, 211–17; Love, *Suez*, 492; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 50–51; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 144, 146–47. For the accuracy of reporting by Israeli military intelligence, see Raymond Cohen, "Israeli Military Intelligence Before the 1956 Sinai Campaign," *Intelligence & National Security* 3 (January 1988):134, 136. Cohen bases his evaluation on recently released Israeli archival material.
7. Haykal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, 125, 129; Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 19; *New York Times*, 31 October 1956:4; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 146, 213; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 51–52; and Dayan, *Diary*, 211.
8. *New York Times*, 31 October 1956:4; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 50–51; and Love, *Suez*, 538. Among Qadi's assignments after the 1956 war were deputy to Syrian Lieutenant General Jamal Faysal of the First Army in Syria during Egypt's union with that country (1958–61); commander of the Egyptian expeditionary force in Yemen until 1964; and the director of operations (G3) at general headquarters in the Six Day War. See Eliezer Be'eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 140; and Muhammad Fawzi, *Harb al-Thalath Sanawat, 1967–1970* [The Three Years' War, 1967–1970] (Beirut: Dar al-Wahda, 1983), 24, 168.
9. *OEMS*.
10. Some literature refers to the brigade commander's name as merely Sami Yassa, and his rank varies between brigadier general and colonel. Unfortunately, *OEMS* did not have the commander's name; nor did they provide it upon request. *New York Times*, 31 October 1956:4; Dayan, *Diary*, 212; Love, *Suez*, 536; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 158.
11. *OEMS*.
12. Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 65, 123; and Love, *Suez*, 536.
13. *OEMS*. Less detailed information appears in Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 97–98; Love, *Suez*, 536, 538; Meir Pa'il, *IDF Campaigns Against Abu Ageila in Three Wars* (Tel Aviv: IDF Publication, n.d.), 12–13; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 158.

14. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 159.
15. OEMS. For a more general summary in English of Egyptian deployments, see Love, *Suez*, 536, 538; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 158–59.
16. OEMS.
17. OEMS; Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 98; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 158; and O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 40.
18. S. L. A. Marshall, *Sinai Victory* (New York: William Morrow, 1958), 95.
19. The actual size of this reserve is given by OEMS.
20. Dayan, *Diary*, 126. For the same assessment, almost in exact terms, see Moshe Dayan, *Moshe Dayan: The Story of My Life* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), 246.
21. OEMS; Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 96; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 13; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 159. Most of the 26th Brigade was located in the Gaza Strip.
22. For a description of this secret conference, see Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 214–33; Donald Neff, *Warriors of Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), 342–48; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 141–43.
23. A detailed treatment of this subject appears in Sylvia K. Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), 29–79. See also Dayan, *Diary*, 34; and Ezer Weizman, *On Eagles' Wings* (New York: Macmillan, 1976), 150. For the critical, last-minute buildup of Israel's Armor Corps, increasing its total number of tanks by 250, see David Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert: The Story of the Israeli Armored Corps* (London: Brassey's, 1989), 27–29.
24. Dayan, *Diary*, 68.
25. Crosbie, *A Tacit Alliance*, 73, 77–79; and Hugh Thomas, *Suez* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 123. For a denial, see Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Vintage Books, 1982), 117.
26. Dayan, *Diary*, 209.
27. Dayan, *Diary*, 210; Avraham Adan, interview with author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2 November 1986; Yehudah Wallach, interview with author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 7 November 1986; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 18; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 148–49.
28. Dayan, *Diary*, 33, 210; Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 234; and Yigal Allon, *Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed Forces* (New York: Random House, 1970), 237.
29. For an excellent discussion on the rise of paratroopers to prominence in the IDF, see Edward N. Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 109–17.
30. Dayan, *Diary*, 85–86, 116; and Wallach interview.
31. Dayan, *Diary*, 220–21; Wallach interview; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 14.
32. Wallach interview; Dayan, *Diary*, 115; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 148, 159. Simhoni had been a member of *Palmach* (or shock companies), the army's elite unit during Israel's War of Independence. At the conclusion of the Sinai campaign, Simhoni, whose plane hit a sudden sandstorm and flew off course, was killed in an airplane crash in Jordan.
33. Ze'ev Eytan, letter to the author, 17 September 1987.
34. Dayan, *Diary*, 210; Wallach interview; Adan interview; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 18; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 148–49.
35. Eytan letter; and Wallach interview.
36. Dayan, *Diary*, 221; Wallach interview; Adan interview; Ze'ev Eytan, interview with author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 4 November 1986; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 15; and Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert*, 33.
37. Dayan, *Diary*, 91, 210; and Wallach interview.

38. Wallach interview; Gunther Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army: The Israel Defense Forces, 1948–1978* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1979), 101; and O'Ballance, *The Sinai Campaign*, 57.
39. Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 151.
40. For the Dayan-Laskov debate, see Shabtai Teveth, *Moshe Dayan: The Soldier, the Man, the Legend* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), 262–63; Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 131–32, 148–49; and Rothenberg, *The Israeli Army*, 100–101.
41. Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 246, 253–55, 259.
42. Dayan, *Diary*, 220–21; and Rothenberg, *The Israeli Army*, 100.
43. Dayan, *Diary*, 39.
44. Wallach interview.
45. Adan interview; and Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert*, 36.

Chapter 2

1. Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, *Shahid 'ala Harb 67* [Witness on the 1967 war] (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974), 143.
2. Dayan, *Diary*, 124.
3. For an account of the Mitla operation, see Ariel Sharon, *Warrior: The Autobiography of Ariel Sharon* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 144–57; Dayan, *Diary*, 77–85; Love, *Suez*, 500–501, 508–10; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 83–89, 105–15; Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 33–50, 67–68; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 150–54; and Louis Williams, "The Sinai Campaign—Thirty Years Later: The Battle for the Mitla Pass," *IDF Journal* 4 (Winter 1987):54–60.
4. Haykal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, 177–78.
5. Haykal, *Qissa al-Suways*, 227–29; Haykal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, 178; Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 94, 112; Love, *Suez*, 501–2, 530; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 154–55.
6. Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 85; Love, *Suez*, 496, 502; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 177.
7. Dayan, *Diary*, 210; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 18; Robert Henriques, *A Hundred Hours to Suez: An Account of Israel's Campaign in the Sinai Peninsula* (New York: Viking Press, 1957), 107; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 147–49.
8. Dayan, *Diary*, 86–87, 91–93; Wallach interview; Adan interview; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 160–61; Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 51–57; and O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 91–97.
9. Adan interview.
10. Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 95; *OEMS*; Wallach interview; Adan interview; Eytan interview; and Love, *Suez*, 538.
11. Dayan, *Diary*, 93; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 161.
12. *OEMS*; Love, *Suez*, 538; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 19; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 163; and Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 138.
13. Dayan, *Diary*, 93. For this engagement, consult *OEMS*; Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 103–5; Love, *Suez*, 538; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 161–62.
14. Dayan, *Diary*, 91.
15. Menachem Shalev, "The Secrets of Mitla Revealed," *The Jerusalem Post*, 31 October 1986:9. Here Shalev cites a paper given at a conference by Mordechai Bar-On who served as Dayan's bureau chief in 1956.
16. Dayan, *Diary*, 96.

17. Ibid.; and Teveth, *Moshe Dayan*, 269.
18. Dayan, *Diary*, 88, 92–93; Teveth, *Moshe Dayan*, 268–69; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 162–63.
19. Eytan interview; Love, *Suez*, 539; Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 106; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 19; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 162; and Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars*, 126.
20. Yehudah Wallach, letter to the author, 20 October 1987; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 164.
21. Adan interview; Eytan interview; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 19–20; A. Harding Ganz, "Abu Ageila—Two Battles, Part 1: 1956," *Armor* 83 (May-June 1974):38–39.
22. Wallach letter. For the timing of the decision, see Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 20.
23. Dayan, *Diary*, 95–96; Wallach interview; Adan interview; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 164; and Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 126.
24. OEMS; Love, *Suez*, 539; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 19; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 163.
25. OEMS; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 105; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 19–20; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 164.
26. OEMS; Love, *Suez*, 539; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 164.
27. Adan interview; Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 108; and O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 103, 122.
28. Avraham Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez* (San Francisco, CA: Presidio Press, 1980), 158–59; Wallach interview; Eytan interview; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 196; and David Eshel, *Mid-East Wars: Israel's Armor in Action* (Tel Aviv: Eshel-Dramit, 1978), 30.
29. Adan interview; Love, *Suez*, 540; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21; Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 109–11; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 121–22; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 165.
30. Love, *Suez*, 539–40; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 163–64, 166.
31. OEMS.
32. Adan interview; Eytan interview; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 125; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 177–78; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21; and Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 127. Israeli sources claim that part of an Egyptian reserve infantry brigade was located at the Abu Ageila road junction at the outset of the war. This force eventually withdrew to Gebel Lebni. It was this force that an IAF pilot mistook for a major Egyptian armor counterstrike force near Abu Ageila. See Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 13, 20; and Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert*, 32, 40, 42.
33. Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 159.
34. Adan interview; and Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 112–13.
35. OEMS.
36. Adan interview; and Dayan, *Diary*, 106–7.
37. Adan interview; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21.
38. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21; and Teveth, *Moshe Dayan*, 270.
39. Dayan, *Diary*, 115.
40. Ibid., 116.
41. Ibid., 117. See also Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 129; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 167.
42. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21–22.
43. Dayan, *Diary*, 121.
44. Wallach interview.

45. Dayan, *Diary*, 115; and Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 245. For a recent view agreeing with Dayan that Ben-Ari's position between Gebel Libni and Abu Ageila was vulnerable to an Egyptian counterattack, see Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert*, 49. A brief discussion of logistical and transportation problems during the campaign appears in O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 195; and Shlomo Barer, *The Weekend War* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1959), 251, 253.
46. Dayan, *Diary*, 151–52; Eytan interview; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 193.
47. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 179.
48. Adan interview; Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 116–18; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 166.
49. Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 119–27; Love, *Suez*, 541; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 166.
50. Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 119; Love, *Suez*, 541; and Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 127.
51. Love, *Suez*, 541.
52. Dayan, *Diary*, 118–19; OEMS; Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 100; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 22–23; Love, *Suez*, 543; Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 128; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 167.
53. Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 99; and Love, *Suez*, 543.
54. Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 98; and O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 131.
55. Wallach interview.
56. Dayan, *Diary*, 126–27; Wallach interview; O'Ballance, *Sinai Campaign*, 192; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 167. There exists some controversy over who decided to remove Goder with Dayan claiming it was Simhoni.
57. Wallach interview.
58. Eytan letter.
59. Wallach interview.
60. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 21.
61. Dayan, *Diary*, 118–19; Wallach interview; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 22–23; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 167.
62. Dayan, *Diary*, 118.
63. Ibid., 119.
64. Haykal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, 179.
65. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 178. Israeli sources claim the Egyptian high command, on the morning of 31 October, ordered one of its armored brigades on the central route to proceed to Gebel Libni and thence to relieve Abu Ageila, but its commander refused to advance owing to Israeli air strikes. See Dayan, *Diary*, 146.
66. Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 75–76, 85–86; OEMS; Love, *Suez*, 501–2; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 155.
67. Haykal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, 181; and Haykal, *Qissa al-Suways*, 233.
68. OEMS; Abd al-Hamid, *Ma'raka*, 108; Haykal, *Qissa al-Suways*, 234; Love, *Suez*, 531–32; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 181. For further information on the withdrawal order for Abu Ageila—as understood from the Israeli perspective—see Dayan, *Diary*, 123–24.
69. Love, *Suez*, 544; and Dayan, *Diary*, 123–24.
70. Love, *Suez*, 544; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 182.
71. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 24.
72. Wallach interview; Eytan interview; Dayan, *Diary*, 122–23; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 26; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 183–84; and Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert*, 46.

73. Love, *Suez*, 634; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 215; and Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 141.
74. Dayan, *Diary*, 151; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 177. Nasser claimed he lost only 30 tanks out of 200 at Bir Rod Salim to the Israeli Air Force. For this statement, see Love, *Suez*, 532. OEMS were vague on the combat status of the 4th Armored Division on 31 October.
75. OEMS.
76. Love, *Suez*, 544. See also, Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 136.
77. OEMS. To help remedy the water problem, the Egyptians constructed underground cisterns for storing water. This information is the result of a discussion by the author with an American officer who visited the battle site in 1986.
78. Haykal, *Cutting the Lion's Tail*, 185.
79. Haykal, *Qissa al-Suways*, 235.
80. Dayan, *Diary*, 124; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 25. For a recent positive evaluation of the orderly Egyptian withdrawal from Abu Ageila by an Israeli military writer, see Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert*, 48.
81. Love, *Suez*, 545.
82. Hasan Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967* [The War of July 1967], vol. 1 (Beirut: al-Mu'assasah al-Arabiyya, 1973), 296, 303.

Chapter 3

1. André Beaufre, "Une Guerre Classique Moderne: La Guerre Israélo-Arabe," *Strategie* (July-August 1967):19.
2. For a general discussion of this period, see the works of Luttwak and Horowitz, Schiff, and Rothenberg cited in the bibliography. Doctrinal changes receive excellent treatment in Israel Tal's, "Israel's Defense Doctrine: Background and Dynamics," *Military Review* 58 (March 1978):22-37. For developments in the Israeli Air Force, see also Weizman, *On Eagles' Wings*, 158.
3. As quoted in Itzhak Betzalel, "David Elazar," in *Generals of Israel*, edited by Moshe Ben Shaul (Tel Aviv: Hadar, 1968), 81-82.
4. Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 63, 130; and Bond, *Liddell Hart*, 238-70.
5. On Tal's thinking, see Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 186-92. For a concise treatment of armor doctrine prior to Tal's tenure as chief of the Armor Corps, see Leo Heiman, "Armor in the Middle East," *Military Review* 43 (September 1963):16-20.
6. Dan Horowitz, "Flexible Responsiveness and Military Strategy: The Case of the Israeli Army," *Policy Sciences* 1 (1970):191-205; and Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 163-64, 172-76.
7. Gideon Avidor, "From Brigade to Division," *Military Review* 58 (October 1978):64-71; Yoram Movshovitz and Dan Petreanu, "The Artillery Corps-1948 to the Present," *IDF Journal* 4 (Fall 1987):18; and conversations with Israeli colonels attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.
8. Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 150; and Shabatai Teveth, *The Tanks of Tammuz* (New York: Viking Press, 1969), 114-15.
9. Wallach interview.
10. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 258.
11. Natke Nir, telephone conversation with the author, 5 October 1987. Other former Israeli commanders possessed a similar evaluation to Nir's; Wallach interview; Eytan interview; Adan interview; and Dov Sion, interview with author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 2 November 1986.

12. For a succinct discussion of the events leading up to the outbreak of the 1967 war, see C. Ernest Dawn, "The Egyptian Remilitarization of Sinai, May 1967," *Journal of Contemporary History* 3 (1968):201–24; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 224–30.
13. Fawzi, *Harb*, 72. For confirmation of the general lack of concern in Syria at this time, see Khalil Mustafa, *Suqut al-Jawlan* [The fall of Golan] (Cairo: Dar al-Tisam, 1980), 214–17. Mustafa was a Syrian military intelligence officer for the Golan before the 1967 war.
14. Hasan Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 94; and Edgar O'Ballance, *The Third Arab-Israeli War* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972), 99. The identification of the regular division comes from Mustafa.
15. An impartial treatment of this issue of the Egyptian request for the withdrawal of UN troops appears in a book written by the Indian major general in charge of UN forces during this period. See Indarjit Rikhye, *The Sinai Blunder: Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force Leading to the Six-Day War of June 1967* (London: Frank Cass, 1980).
16. Uzi Narkiss, *The Liberation of Jerusalem: The Battle of 1967* (London: Valentine Mitchell, 1983), 53. Major General Narkiss was in charge of the Central Command in the 1967 war.
17. The problem of suddenly creating a front command has received much attention in Egyptian military literature, but Western writers remain completely ignorant of the subject. Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 113, 141–42, 158–60; Abd al-Mohsen Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui Rawiya al-Haq'a'iq" [General Murtagui discusses the truth], unpublished manuscript, 28, 58–59, 62; Fawzi, *Harb*, 92, 103; Amin Huwaydi, *Adwa 'ala Asbab Naksa 1967 wa 'ala Harb al-Istiznaf* [Insight into the reasons for the setback of 1967 and the war of attrition] (Beirut: Dar al-Taliah, 1975), 38–40, 60–62; and Musa Sabri, *Watha'iq Harb Oktobir* [Documents on the October War] (Cairo: al-Kitab al-Misri al-Hadith lil Taba'a al-Nashr, 1974), 359. For a more detailed treatment of the Egyptian problems of command and control in the 1967 war, see George W. Gawrych, "The Egyptian High Command in the 1973 War," *Armed Forces and Society* 13 (Summer 1987):535–46.
18. Fawzi, *Harb*, 92; and Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 114; and *OEMS*.
19. The only detailed discussion of Plan Qahir is by the then Egyptian chief of the General Staff. See Fawzi, *Harb*, 99–102. See also Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 240–41.
20. All the significant changes made in the Egyptian Army from 15 May to 4 June are discussed in detail in Fawzi, *Harb*, 104–15; and Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 64–116.
21. Ze'ev Schiff, *A History of the Israeli Army: 1874 to the Present* (New York: Macmillan, 1985), 133; B. H. Liddell Hart, "Strategy of a War," *Encounter* 30 (February 1968):18; O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 102; and Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six Day War* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), 104.
22. Fawzi, *Harb*, 106, 112; and Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 90, 94–95.
23. Fawzi, *Harb*, 93; and Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 120.
24. al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 38–50, 154–55.
25. *OEMS*.
26. For a good book representative of this view, see Abd al-Hamid, *Maraka*.
27. al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 45, makes such a comparison, arguing that in the process such myth making undermined the combat preparedness of the armed forces.
28. Abd al-Hamid, *Maraka*, 104–8.
29. *OEMS*.
30. Arye Hashavia, *A History of the Six Day War* (Tel Aviv: Ledory Publishing House, 1967), 81–82.
31. al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 137–38; and Fawzi, *Harb*, 49.
32. al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 140.

33. *OEMS*.
34. Yael Dayan, *Israel Journal: June, 1967* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 42.
35. Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 150; and *OEMS*. Literature on the 1967 battle of Abu Ageila perpetuates the myth of an exact replica of the Soviet system, with three lines of defense and three trench lines. See Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 244–45; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 257; O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 121; A. J. Barker, *Arab-Israeli Wars* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1980), 70; A. Harding Ganz, "Abu Ageila, Two Battles—Part II: 1967," *Armor* 83 (July-August 1974):15; and Sewall H. Menzel, "Zahal Blitzkrieg: The Sinai Campaign of 1967 Exemplified Modern Warfare," *Armor* 95 (November-December 1986):29. For an example in French literature, see Samuel Seguev, *La Guerre de Six Jours* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1967), 143, 147.
36. *OEMS*. For more general descriptions of Egyptian forces, see Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 258; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 35.
37. *OEMS* claim a figure of approximately 15,000. The figure of 18,450 comes from Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 624. For the number of 11,000 for a standard infantry division, see al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 114n.
38. For the number of sixty-six tanks, see Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 244; Rothenberg, *The Israeli Army*, 141; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 36. For the number of ninety tanks or a brigade, see, for example, Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 258. Apparently, at this time, the Egyptian Army had tank brigades and tank regiments, the former consisting of three battalions of thirty-three tanks each, while the latter was comprised of only two tank battalions. See Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 94n.
39. *OEMS*. Little detailed information concerning Egyptian deployments exists in English. For a general agreement concerning types and locations of the various Egyptian battalions in and around Abu Ageila, see Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 35.
40. *OEMS*. For an Israeli source confirming the existence of four artillery battalions within Abu Ageila, see Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 35, 47.
41. *OEMS*. Confirmation from Israeli sources that the bulk of Egyptian armor lay outside the main defensive perimeter came from Natke Nir in a telephone conversation with the author, 5 October 1987.
42. *OEMS*.
43. *Ibid*.
44. Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 193; and Eliahu Ben Elissar and Ze'ev Schiff, *La Guerre Israelo-Arab: 5–10 Juin 1967* (Paris: Julliard, 1967), 152.
45. *OEMS*.
46. *Ibid*. For the name of Naguib, see Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 239, 339. Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 96, identifies the commander's name as Major General Muhammad Kamil Abd al-Aziz. *OEMS* do not divulge the name of the Egyptian divisional commander.

Chapter 4

1. Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 290.
2. For Dayan's thinking and the development of the final plan, see Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 287–347 passim; Yitzak Rabin, *The Rabin Memoirs* (Boston, MA: Little and Brown, 1979), 79–98 passim; and Weizman, *On Eagles' Wings*, 212–16, 220. These three men were the defense minister, chief of the General Staff, and director of operations, respectively.
3. For press statements made immediately after the war by Generals Gavish, Sharon, Tal, and Yoffe concerning the operational plan, see Israel Defense Forces, *Commanders of the Six Day War and Their Battle Reports* (Tel Aviv: Ramdor, 1967), 39–41, 45, 51, 59, hereafter cited as IDF, *Commanders*. See also Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 340–41, 359–61; and Rabin,

- Memoirs*, 98, 102. For secondary literature on the plan, see Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 233; Teveth, *Moshe Dayan*, 333; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 243–44, 252; Nadav Safran, *Israel: The Embattled Ally* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), 243–45; and Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 157.
4. Gavish, Yeshayahu, "The Southern Front in the 1967 War," *Safra Sayfa* 4 (1981):49 (in Hebrew).
 5. OEMS; Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 193; Hashavia, *History*, 84; and Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 152.
 6. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 30.
 7. Sion interview.
 8. Churchill and Churchill, *Six Day War*, 122.
 9. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 35.
 10. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 37, 47; Seguev, *La Guerre*, 144; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 27; Hashavia, *History*, 84–85; S. L. A. Marshall, *Swift Sword: The Historical Record of Israel's Victory, June 1967* (New York: American Heritage, 1967), 55; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 258.
 11. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 624.
 12. Sion interview; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 37.
 13. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, 56; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 37; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 37.
 14. Nir telephone conversation.
 15. Ibid.; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 37.
 16. Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 233.
 17. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 37; Seguev, *La Guerre*, 144; Hashavia, *History*, 85; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 258; and Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 149–50.
 18. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 37; Seguev, *La Guerre*, 144; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 27; Hashavia, *History*, 84, 88–89; Marshall, *Swift Sword*, 55; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 258; and Eshel, *Chariots of the Desert*, 73. Some sources claim the Israeli armored brigade contained Nir's force as its second tank battalion; others say Zippori had his own two tank battalions and that Nir's force belonged to Sharon's *ugdah*.
 19. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 37; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 259.
 20. Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 199. OEMS confirm the use of the word "heart" to describe the importance of artillery.
 21. David Dayan, *Strike First! A Battle History of Israel's Six-Day War* (New York: Pitman, 1967), 10.
 22. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 46.
 23. Ibid., 55. For Sharon's own description of the plan for capturing Abu Ageila, see Sharon, *Warrior*, 185–91.
 24. Two officers who joined the quiet rebellion against Sharon later became chiefs of the General Staff: Mordechai Gur (1974–78) and Rafel Eitan (1978–83). For a brief discussion of the controversy concerning Sharon, see Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 95–96.
 25. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 244, 258; Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 190; and Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 246.
 26. al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 183–86; and Huwaydi, *'Adua*, 108–11. The Egyptians felt the border incident might have been a trial balloon to test Egyptian reaction, but if so, it jeopardized the surprise element for the Israeli air strikes. The matter remains unresolved at this point.
 27. al-Hadidi, *Shahid*, 184–88; Fawzi, *Harb*, 134–35; and Huwaydi, *'Adua*, 62–63.

28. Zippori's account appears in IDF, *Commanders*, 84–85. See also Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 258; O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 122–23; and Ganz, "Abu Ageila–1967," 18. Israelis claim a faster fall; see Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 40; Dayan, *Strike First!*, 55; and Barker, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 70.
29. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 34.
30. Ibid., 40.
31. Dayan, *Strike First!*, 55–56; and O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 123.
32. Adam's version appears in IDF, *Commanders*, 80–81. See also Seguev, *La Guerre*, 147; Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 153; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 40; Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 196; and Ganz, "Abu Ageila–1967," 18.
33. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 41.
34. Nir telephone conversation.
35. Material on the battle for Position 181 comes from various sources: Nir telephone conversation; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 41; Seguev, *La Guerre*, 149; OEMS; Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 194; Eshel, *Mid-East Wars*, 53–54; Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 152–53; Marshall, *Swift Sword*, 56; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 41; and Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 159. Some sources claim the existence of T-54s at Awlad Ali.
36. Nir telephone conversation.
37. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 58–59; Sion interview; and O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 142–43.
38. OEMS.
39. OEMS; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 48, 55–56; David Eshel, *Mid-East Wars: The Israeli Commando's* (Tel Aviv: Eshel-Dramit, 1979), 31–33; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 259; O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 124–25; Barker, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 70–71; Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 154; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 42; and Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 246.
40. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 41.
41. Sharon, *Warrior*, 192; Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 154; Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 247–48n; and O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 125, 128.
42. Marshall, *Swift Sword*, 58–60; and W. Byford-Jones, *The Lightning War* (London: Hale, 1967), 88.
43. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 47.
44. Teveth, *Tanks of Tammuz*, 208–12; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila in Three Wars*, map 6.
45. The claim that Sharon possessed excellent intelligence concerning Egyptian defenses at Abu Ageila is suggested by the Nir telephone conversation; M. Barkai, "The Battle of Kuti's Infantry Brigade," *Ma'arachot* 190 (1968):22; and Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 200.
46. Churchill and Churchill, *Six Day War*, 121.
47. OEMS; and Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 199.
48. Eshel, *The Israeli Commando's*, 32–33; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 42; Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 157; and O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 130–31.
49. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 56; Sion interview; and Dayan, *Strike First!*, 56–57.
50. OEMS.
51. Ibid.
52. Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, 95. For a similar evaluation made at roughly the same time, see Robert Henriques, *A Hundred Hours*, 115.
53. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 259; and Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 247.

54. For Adam's own words, see IDF, *Commanders*, 81. See also Barkai, "Kuti's Infantry Brigade," 12—24; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 48; and O'Ballance, *The Third Arab-Israeli War*, 126.
 55. Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 53. Arab sources confirming the use of different colored lights by Israeli infantry assaulting the trenches include OEMS; and Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 198.
 56. Barkai, "Kuti's Infantry Brigade," 12—24.
 57. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 42—43; and O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 131—32.
 58. Barkai, "Kuti's Infantry Brigade," 12—24.
 59. Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 199; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 40; Dayan, *Strike First!*, 57; O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 131—32; and Barkai, "The Battle of Kuti's Infantry Brigade."
 60. OEMS.
 61. Nir telephone conversation; Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 40—41; Dayan, *Israel Journal*, 61; Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 260—61; O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 132n.
 62. OEMS.
 63. Ben Elissar and Schiff, *La Guerre*, 157—59; Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 200; O'Ballance, *Third Arab-Israeli War*, 132—33; and Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 40.
 64. Pa'il, *Abu Ageila*, 45; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 261.
 65. Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 157.
 66. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 267; Fawzi, *Harb*, 154; and Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 220.
 67. Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 153. This is borne out by the movement of the 2d Armored Brigade (4th Armored Division) to this region during the 5th. The 2d was ordered to pull back to Bir al-Thamada only at 1100 on the 6th. For its commander's account, see Kamal Hasan Ali, *Mudarrabun wa Mufawwadun* [Warriors and negotiators] (Cairo: al-Ahram, 1986), 35—36.
 68. Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 148—49; and Mustafa, *Harb Haziran 1967*, 205—10.
 69. Fawzi, *Harb*, 151—59; Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 183—85; and Huwaydi, 'Adwa 'ala Asbab Naksa 1967, 69.
 70. Teveth, *Tanks of Tammuz*, 222—25; Herzog, *Arab-Israeli Wars*, 160—61; Luttwak and Horowitz, *The Israeli Army*, 249—50; and Dupuy, *Elusive Victory*, 270—71. Sharon implies that he never participated in this meeting; Sharon, *Warrior*, 202.
 71. Dayan, *Moshe Dayan*, 363; and Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, "The Bar-Lev Line Revisited," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 11 (June 1988):150.
 72. Murtagui, "al-Fariq Murtagui," 169.
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